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John Beverley’s Latinamericanism after 9/11 seeks to reposition the field of Latin American Studies in
response to what he views as a new historical conjuncture associated with the aftermath of September 11,
2001. Whereas in the US and Europe the impact of 9/11 is perceived mainly through the refocusing of foreign
policy and national security in the “war on terror,” in Latin America post-9/11 is shaped by the political
ascendancy of Left-populist regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina and elsewhere. Through
popular social and economic programs as well as a “Bolivarian” discourse of regional unity against
imperialism, these governments have rejected the dominant neoliberal economic model while presenting
themselves as a bulwark against U.S. influence in the region. Often referred to collectively as the marea
rosada, these populist regimes are viewed by many as proof that the Washington Consensus has come to an
end. If that is the case, it remains an open question whether 9/11 and its aftermath facilitates a reaffirmation
of national sovereignty in Latin America, as Beverley believes, or whether it exposes even more drastically the
crisis of sovereignty, as others would no doubt argue. [1] [#N1]
As Arturo Escobar (2010) points out, the contemporary context in which the marea rosada emerges must be
situated within a longer history of Latin America’s relation to the West. The challenge to neoliberal hegemony
is also the latest critical failure in a much longer history—dating back perhaps as far as the Conquest—of
efforts to institute modernity in Latin America. What is at stake in recent experiments in Left populism in
Latin America is not only the articulation of alternatives to the free-market economic model first introduced in
the region some four decades ago, nor just a rejection of US influence, but also the question of whether these
regimes—or the popular movements that support them—could potentially constitute a break with the entirety
of modern political configurations of the social. The promise associated with the marea rosada is that of a
Latin American modernity whose conceptualization and implementation would no longer be predetermined
by developmentalist teleologies that take Western European modernity as the model, goal and culmination of
all regional histories.
Intellectual biography provides an ever-present counterpoint to socio-political context in Latinamericanism
after 9/11. As far as Beverley’s own trajectory is concerned, chavismo and its allies announce the imminent
end of subalternity in Latin America. Beverley marks and responds to this hope by repositioning himself as a
post-subalternist Latinamericanist. What is post-subalternism? If the governments of Chávez, Morales and
Correa have opened up new avenues for social membership and political participation among historically
marginalized groups such as campesinos, indigenous populations and urban slum dwellers, while also
implementing economic redistribution projects that arguably go beyond mere reformism, then in Beverley’s
view these regimes give evidence that Latin America is now on the verge of freeing itself from a long history of
colonial, neocolonial and imperial domination under which the hegemonic production of nation and
nationalisms had always engendered subalternity as their disavowed—but also equiprimordial or even
constitutive—excess. As Beverley sees it, the new and still emerging possibilities for reconfiguration of social
and political forces announces a new historical conjuncture that subalternism and other post-structuralist
theories are incapable of seeing—or just unwilling to recognize:
2/17/2020 Critique of Critique
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/pc/12322227.0004.008?view=text;rgn=main 2/9
The paradigm implicit in subaltern studies (and in postmodernist theory in general) was that of
the separation of the state and the subaltern. The intention was to recognize and support both
previously existing and newly emergent forms of resistance that did not pass through
conventional historical narratives of state formation and statist forms of citizenship and political
or social participation. We are now confronted paradoxically in some ways by the success of a
series of political initiatives in Latin America that, speaking very broadly, corresponded to the
concerns of subaltern studies. In a situation where, as is the case of several governments of the
marea rosada, social movements from the popular-subaltern sectors of society have “become the
state,” to borrow a phrase from Ernesto Laclau, or are bidding to do so, a new way of thinking
the relationship between the state and society has become necessary. (Beverley 8-9)
Beverley’s post-subalternist position is a profession of faith. The condition of subalternity is nowhere near
eradication in Latin America today, not even in the societies of the marea rosada. Who can say, after all, that,
if the post-Chávez President of Venezuela Nicolás Maduro or Evo Morales were to fall out of power tomorrow,
that the political projects that have become associated with their names would continue in their absence, and
previously marginalized groups could still appear and act as equals within a democratic distribution of the
sensible? If the only factor capable of forestalling the return of subalternization is the Name of the Father, can
one really state with such confidence that it is no longer productive to concern oneself with subalternity? [2]
[#N2] The “post” in Beverley’s position marks a promissory horizon. But it is also clearly intended as a
provocation against certain theoretical tendencies in the Latin American humanities that Beverley views as
fatally behind the times, still speaking of subalternity and still thinking the limits of the state at a moment
when the history of exclusion of the subaltern from hegemony has arguably been brought to a halt, at which
point Beverley would assert that the negative work of theoretical critique runs the risk of inadvertently
undermining the new democratic promise sweeping across Latin America. If all of what Beverley calls
“postmodernist theory” is premised on the axiomatic exclusion of the subaltern from the social count, and if
the marea rosada marks the beginning of the end of structural inequality and permanent domination, then
subalternist critiques of the state would now find themselves aiming at a target that has already been rendered
obsolete—on the ground; not thanks to theory but through real social struggles. Even worse, critique would be
guilty of perpetuating skepticism at a time when what is needed from the Left is more solidarity with the state,
with the good states—assuming, that is, that we know how to discern them.
While I take issue with many of Beverley’s assertions and conclusions, my intention is not to write a critique of
Latinamericanism after 9/11. It is not critique per se that interests me here but instead, as I will try to explain,
the question of where critique falls short or of what falls out of critique. Whatever disagreements I have with
Beverley’s book (and there are many), I find it to be a much needed intervention in the field, one that lays out
some of the most important issues facing the Latinamericanist humanities today, including relations between
the university and the social realities it seeks to understand, between North America and Latin America, and,
last but not least, between theory and praxis or critique and politics. The book’s greatest virtue, in my view, is
to have presented these matters for debate at a moment when conversation about the state of the
Latinamericanist humanities appears—at least to me and many of my friends and colleagues—to have been
losing intellectual vitality. If some of us have been feeling that the field is no longer focused on a core set of
problems and debates, Beverley’s book—whether you agree with it or disagree with it—could be a step in the
direction of changing that.
Latinamericanism after 9/11 can be read as a kind of confessional tale. Behind the stories of the disbanding of
the Latin American Subaltern Studies Group and Beverley’s decision to move away from subaltern studies we
encounter echoes of an older history of his endeavors to merge academic interest in testimonio with a
passionate political engagement with the Central American armed insurgencies of the 1970s and 80s. Behind
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all of this in turn lurks a deep-seated anxiety concerning Beverley’s own relation to Latin America. He is and
always has been acutely aware of the distances separating him as a North American academic—and of course it
is not just him but all of us—from Latin American “objects” of inquiry, not to mention the potential problems
and pitfalls (epistemological, ethical, political) that accompany the academic project of Latin Americanism as a
whole. One of the anticipated effects of this repositioning from subalternism to “post-subalternism” would be
a resolution of what Alberto Moreiras calls the consubstantial “dissymmetrical gaze” of Latin Americanism
(2001 129).
To his credit, Beverley acknowledges some possible objections to his post-subalternist position. One such
objection is that we simply cannot know—at least not yet—how the marea rosada will pan out, what its future
holds, whether it will culminate in substantive social transformation or prove to have been little more than a
demagogic return to authoritarian state capitalism. It is true, Beverley allows, that the regimes of the marea
rosada have shown disconcerting antidemocratic tendencies toward authoritarianism, personalism and
corruption, and in many cases have proven intolerant of dissensus. But despite any misgivings, Beverley’s
conclusion is that, no matter how authoritarian and repressive, no matter how corrupt they may be or become,
these Left populist governments could not possibly be worse than the neoliberal alternative. By the same
token, they stand a chance of being orders of magnitude better. A second possible objection to Beverley’s
position concerns the question of ideology’s form versus its content. Beverley advocates academic solidarity
with the marea rosada because of its sociopolitical content: these regimes enable certain socially and
ethnically defined actors (campesinos, indigenous groups and urban poor) who were systematically excluded
from social and political life to participate for the first time as equals. While such inclusions represent a
welcome change, they do not resolve a separate problem associated with ideology: that of formal exclusion, or
the logical problem that any postulation of social unity (a society, a group or even an individual identity) must
be premised on a contingent determination—of inside/outside or proper/improper—that tends to pass itself
off as natural or necessary. The ideological postulation of social unity presupposes exclusion insofar as there
can be no “us” without a corresponding “not-us”. This is a formal law that cannot be affected by the inclusion
of determinate groups and identities, however desirable and necessary such inclusions may be. Indeed, it is a
form of exclusion that accompanies and conditions any and all determinations of “identity” and “unity” as
such. Beverley acknowledges the problem—that, with this second account of exclusion, the form/content
distinction no longer holds up, the form of ideology is itself the content (cf., p.135, note 18)—and yet he glosses
over its implications, which are considerable.
Perhaps, as Alberto Moreiras suggests, this is because Beverley accepts that there is no outside of ideology
and, as calculative thinking sees things, if “everything is ideology anyway, and there is no getting out of it, then
some ideologies are better than others, and we should swallow them whole or, rather, we should allow the
people to swallow them whole, and even ask them to swallow them whole” (“Fatality”, 9). Everything is
ideology, as Moreiras puts it, because the exit from ideology—the gesture of overcoming false consciousness, of
exposing a mask or façade—is itself the essence of ideology, understood as imaginary identification with a
fantasized wholeness. What such calculations about ideology and its omnipresence overlook, however, is the
difference between stating that there is no outside of ideology and advocating uncritical acceptance or
fetishization of a particular ideology. Just because there is no such thing as a pure, non-ideological space
outside of ideology does not necessarily mean that everything is pure ideology through and through. And if
everything is not 100% unadulterated ideology, then one of the tasks of thinking ought to be precisely to think
the “internal” limits of ideology: interpellation as misrecognition, subalternity as the constitutive outside of
hegemony, the crisis of sovereignty, and so on.
In his calculative wager Beverley takes issue with what he calls the “New Latin Americanists,” a shorthand for
Latinamericanists whose work is influenced by deconstruction and theoretical suspicions about hegemony.
The limitation of theoretically-driven work in today’s humanities, as he sees it, lies in a “continuing over-
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valuation of intellectual and cultural critique that...the New Latin Americanists share with neo-Arielism. Since
its tools are those of philosophical critique, deconstruction is unable to interrogate adequately its own
conditions of possibility” (54). Latinamericanist work informed by deconstruction and subaltern studies has a
blind-spot, Beverley claims, that impedes its ability to make connections with Latin American lived
experiences and social realities. Not only does deconstructive subaltern studies remain silent about its own
situatedness at the heart of Empire (most of the academics working in this direction are employed in Anglo-
American universities), it also comes dangerously close to exoticizing its object of study—because it continues
to focus on the problem of subalternity despite signs that the subalterns have begun to articulate their own
counter-hegemonic projects. Whatever happens with the marea rosada, New Latinamericanism will continue
to speak of subalternity, Beverley implies, simply because that is the side on which its bread is buttered. He is
not saying anything new with this charge, but is recycling allegations made by other critics of subaltern studies
and deconstruction. In my view such criticisms have been dealt with sufficiently by Alberto Moreiras in The
Exhaustion of Difference (see in particular Chapter Eight: “The Order of Order: On the Reluctant Culturalism
of anti-Subalternist Critiques”) and I will therefore focus instead on the question of critique which comes up
repeatedly in Beverley’s book.
In Beverley’s argument, “critique” functions as a metonym for deconstruction and as a symptom of what is
wrong with the theoretical humanities today. Deconstruction’s reliance on critique as negative modality of
thought impedes translation of theory into praxis or action. To paraphrase Marx, the New Latinamericanism
remains content to critique the world, but the point is to change it. Or at least its preoccupation with critique
interferes with the predictable and reliable transfer of reflection into action: Beverley also raises the specter
that the negative force of deconstruction might inadvertently derail projects for radical social and political
transformation; that is, it might make a negative difference. What Beverley wants, then, is not to do away with
theory tout court but to establish a clear distinction between theories that promote politically effective and
desirable praxis (the right decisions and the good actions) and theories that postpone or paralyze it. Of course
the question of who decides what is effective and desirable, and on what grounds, is left answered by Beverley.
It is not a small irony that, in his commentaries on the state of the field, Beverley proves unable to refrain from
the very critical mode with which he finds fault in the work of others. His book is nothing if not a sustained
critique of what he considers influential but dangerously outdated intellectual trends in the field today:
deconstruction, subalternism, post-hegemony, neo-Arielism. Morever, Beverley’s identification of
deconstruction with philosophical critique raises significant problems; and, to be perfectly clear, Beverley does
assert that he means the philosophical tradition of critique and not a more recent, generalized use of the term
that is roughly synonymous with literary and cultural analyses attentive to rhetoric or language, or even the
everyday use of “critique” as a synonym for fault-finding or denunciation. [3] [#N3]
In that regard, it seems to me that the history of the term “critique” in fact has little to do with what makes
Beverley uncomfortable about theory, and that it may in fact be at the limits of critique where his uneasiness
begins. The distinction is important. The term “critique” comes from the Greek krinein, whose myriad of
meanings [to separate, to distinguish, to sever, to decide] indicate unambiguously why trying to establish a
hard and fast distinction between critique and action might be too simplifying and ultimately unhelpful.
Immanuel Kant described the 18  century as the “age of criticism,” emphasizing the Enlightenment idea of
the human as a rational, autonomous, self-governing consciousness that is born free from the constraints and
coerciveness of religious and political authorities. When it comes to Kant’s own philosophy, critique loses most
if not all of its negative associations. In addition to freeing philosophy from the illusions of traditional
metaphysics, Kantian critique assumes the task of establishing the minimal but solid foundations for a new
metaphysics, a system that would know how to operate within the limits of reason. Thus Kantian critique is
essentially affirmative. While Beverley might rightly take issue with the Eurocentric limitations of the
Enlightenment tradition, presumably he is not interested in discarding the principles of autonomy and critical
th
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self-awareness to which critique gives expression, since that is precisely what he locates in the political
philosophies and economic programs of the marea rosada understood as a regionalist critique of imperial and
post-colonial authority.
Philosophical critique in the Enlightenment and Kantian traditions is associated with the search for clear
divisions, stable distinctions and the purification of rational thought of its non-rational others—that is, of
illusions, superstition, coercion, heteronomy and so on. [4] [#N4] Critique seeks to erect unambiguous,
uncontested, permanent distinctions between inside and outside. In that light, Beverley’s efforts to rid
Latinamericanism of the uncertainties and anxieties that cloud its reflection and muddy the political waters—
or at least to cordon those doubts off and keep them contained in the realm of deconstruction and
subalternism—shares more with the tradition of critique than Beverley is willing to acknowledge.
What I want to propose in response to Beverley’s “critique” is that critique, while absolutely necessary, is not
in itself enough. In the process I will call into question Beverley’s tendency to gloss over the matter of how
different academic practices understand the interrelatedness of theory and praxis, or
subalternist/deconstructive theoretical practice and politics. In so doing, I can of course only speak for myself.
Beverley asserts that all of those involved in the Latin American Subaltern Studies group—and, by extension,
the so-called New Latinamericanists—viewed and view theoretical work as a means to effecting concrete social
change in the interest of alleviating problems of inequality and domination. My own view of the relation
between academic work and sociopolitical realities is somewhat different. As I see it, there is no direct avenue
between the work we do in the humanities and the world of politics (at least the form of politics that interests
Beverley; there may well be other forms). This is not to say that there is no connection between what we do in
the university and what happens in the “outside world,” nor is it to deny that we can and should get involved in
political matters. But when I act politically I do so not as an academic, not in the name of my academic
formation and title—in part because I do not believe that my training and expertise confer any special
qualification or authority when it comes to shared decisions about allocating limited social resources, etc.
Insofar as Beverley’s position requires him to speak and act in the name of his own academic qualifications, it
seems to me that his book in fact reproduces the very dissymmetrical gaze it seeks to alleviate.
Let me return to the question of critique and its limits. From the standpoint of the university in general and
the Latinamericanist humanities in particular, critique is necessary in order to protect academic freedom
against the incursions of external forces (economic, political, religious, etc.) that seek to utilize the university
and its resources for their own purposes. Critique contributes to constituting a politics of the university. The
ethical responsibility of the modern university, as Kant described it in The Conflict of the Faculties, is its
absolute commitment to the pursuit of truth over all other concerns (power, public opinion, ideology, etc.). In
light of the university’s unconditional commitment to truth, critique acts to preserve the freedom of inquiry,
the freedom to ask questions, no matter how unpopular or controversial they might be—and even when those
questions concern the nature or determination of truth itself. However, critique by itself would not be enough,
because truth—whenever and wherever it happens—takes the form of an event rather than a pre-existing fact
waiting to be discovered or a performative act of production. It is there in the question of truth as event, it
seems to me, that Beverley’s call for academic solidarity with the “good” Latin American states becomes deeply
problematic.
Beverley’s book is based on the premise that 9/11 constitutes an event in the strong sense of the term. To speak
of an event is to say that what takes place is fundamentally new or that its occurrence causes the familiar
ground on which we stand to shift in some way. The event punctures what Heidegger calls the horizon of
precomprehension within which we ask questions, understand, and act in our world (Heidegger, 24-8). What
we call an event may well be something for which we do not have a proper name and which we do not know
how to analyze or talk about. It catches us unawares, surprises us and leaves us as if we were without a map
and compass in the world, as if our accustomed cognitive tools had suddenly been rendered inadequate. The
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event coincides with the undeniable sense that something has happened, something singular and
unprecedented, something indelible and unforgettable, that is transforming (or has already transformed) the
way we see the world, think about it, and act in it.
We tend to speak of the attacks of September 11, 2001 and their role in reshaping our world by metonymy: we
name what happened—sometimes the attacks themselves, sometimes the seemingly endless ripple effects—
with a date, which is then condensed to an arrangement of numbers separated by a slash. Needless to say, this
telegraphy figures prominently in the title and argumentation of Beverley’s book. The telegraphic mode
attests, according to Jacques Derrida, to an experience of disjuncture between the undeniable materiality of
the occurrences on the one hand, and the ways in which cognition and analytical processes (or, in a word,
theory) fall short in its attempt to grasp the significance of the event on the other hand. As Derrida puts it, “the
brevity of the appellation (September 11, 9/11) stems not only from an economic or rhetorical necessity. The
telegram of this metonymy—a name, a number—points out the unqualifiable by recognizing that we do not
recognize or even cognize, that we do not yet know how to qualify, that we do not know what we are talking
about” (Borradori, 85-86):
As long as I can produce and determine an event by a performative act guaranteed, like any
performative, by conventions, legitimate fictions, and a certain “as if,” then...what takes place,
arrives, happens or happens to me remains still controllable and programmable within a horizon
of anticipation or precomprehension, within a horizon, period. It is of the order of the
masterable possible, it is the unfolding of what is already possible. It is of the order of power, of
the “I can,” “I may,” or “I am empowered to” (....) There is no future and no relation to the
coming of the event without experience of the “perhaps.” What takes place does not have to
announce itself as possible or necessary; if it did, its irruption as event would in advance be
neutralized. The event belongs to a perhaps that is in keeping not with the possible but with the
impossible. (Derrida 235)
In “The University Without Condition” Derrida approaches the problems presented by the event for
experience and understanding through reference to J.L. Austin’s distinction between constative and
performative speech acts. Constative language describes what already exists while performative acts bring a
new situation into existence or modifies an existing situation. The structure of the event clearly shares
something with the concept of the performative; it too is of the order of creation or arriving rather than mere
description. But there is one important difference: whereas a performative act appeals to conventions and
professes mastery over what it brings into existence (e.g., “I call this meeting to order” has performative
authority if spoken in a context where it is conventionally appropriate and recognizable), an event names an
occurrence whose impact cannot be calculated in advance, and which does not obey established conventions
for, if it did, it would not truly constitute an event. If what Derrida calls iterability constitutes the fundamental
law of language—repetition at the origin in all linguistics acts, by definition; a sign must be recognizable and
repeatable in order to signify something—then the nature of the event would require us to leave repetition
behind in favor of thinking the first time as irruption of the absolutely singular.
As it turns out, however, things are not quite so simple. For what I just called “the nature of the event” is,
according to Derrida, divided from the beginning by a conditional “perhaps.” What is this “perhaps” telling us?
On one hand, to speak of an event refers, as we have already seen, to the uncertainty of what arrives—like the
marea rosada, which may or may not turn out to have been an event. If what arrives is indeed an event (if it
will have been an event) then by definition its arrival cannot be named, predicted or ascertained in advance.
The nature of an event is to catch us unawares; the event always arrives too early, or we too late. And yet, on
the other hand, one could also say that the event itself always arrives too late, precisely because we—as
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Kantian subjects or as Latinamericanists whose perception depends on the synthetic powers of the
imagination—are always there ahead of time, waiting for it, imposing on it our schemata, our paradigms, the
precomprehension within which we live. The experience of the event is thus defined by an aporia: to be an
event it must somehow puncture our horizon of preconception, and yet for us to be able to experience and
speak about it, the event must somehow submit to the iterability of language and the schematic nature of
cognition.
While any event worthy of the name entails an interruption of the prevailing distribution of the sensible, in the
case of the marea rosada it is not clear—not yet anyway—what exactly the difference will be and exactly how
much weight (epistemological, political, ethical) should be assigned to it. Radical transformation or
reformism? Revolution or the eternal return of the authoritarian Father? One cannot know, although the event
—if there is one—may already have taken place, perhaps. While Beverley acknowledges these uncertainties, he
nonetheless advocates a turn from theoretical reflection to engaged solidarity with the more radical strains of
Left populism. The problem is not that Beverley decides in favor a form of action which may in the end prove
to be mistaken; after all, even deconstruction recognizes that reflection cannot provide reliable roadmaps for
ethical and political decisions, and thus it too acknowledges the need to act in the face of irreducible
uncertainty. The problem with Beverley’s position is not that he might be wrong (though he might) but that his
position necessarily collapses the limit that is shared by thinking and acting, theory and politics, the university
and “the outside world.” He wants to bring them together and make them into one unified space that has been
purified of all doubts, all questions and all others; or at least his position leads logically to that conclusion. But
I would propose that it is precisely at this limit—and only at this limit—between thought and action that
anything like an event has a chance of arriving. Any space that has been freed of all such limits, meanwhile,
can only have room for the programmatic reproduction of the same.
Earlier I suggested that Latinamericanism after 9/11 is in part the product of Beverley’s own doubts and
misgivings concerning the university and its relation to the world around it, uncertainties that are exacerbated
by the North/South, intellectual/subaltern dissymmetries that accompany his particular practice as a
Latinamericanist. I propose that Beverley’s abandonment of subaltern studies and his self-transformation into
an intellectual of the post-subaltern state are decisions that seek to resolve the self-conscious disquiet found in
much of his writing, concerning the academic construction of objects of study, the social and political impact
of research and teaching, and the perceived limitations of theory. This sense of unease is in no way specific to
Beverley: it comes with the territory and is, I believe, an essential component of any field’s vitality. In
Latinamericanism after 9/11, however, the response to these doubts and concerns takes the form of an
attempt to purify academic work of the epistemological, ethical and political doubts that plague it: Does it deal
with real problems in the world? Or does it merely grapple with phantasmatic pseudo-problems of its own
making? Does it make a difference in the world? Does it make the right difference? How can we be sure?
Beverley wants to rid academic work of all doubt and uncertainty as to its own status in the world: of the
material reality of its being in the world versus its capacity to constitute an autonomous space of free
reflection. It is in that sense that I have argued that his book in fact shares significant ground with
philosophical critique. Beverley tries to purge such doubts by creating—in what he calls New Latin
Americanism—a figure of hyperbolic skepticism, one that never ceases to ask questions and poke around at
received ideas and prevailing common sense, and thereby renders itself incapable of translating reflection into
action. By associating theory with a radical negativity that is incapable of deciding, Beverley seeks to present
himself as someone who has surpassed those limitations, which then turn out to be nothing more than ripple
effects of the negativity of critique. Latinamericanism after 9/11 teaches us that doubt and uncertainty about
the world and our place in it, instead of serving as invitations to academic inquiry, are just the consequence of
too much thinking, too much theory and not enough acting.
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What I am describing as Beverley’s calculative elimination of the internal limits of the university and the
humanities is clearly at odds with his views on national politics in the US, especially concerning illegal
immigration and social conflict. Beverley’s book, moreover, is itself a sustained reflection on the question of
the limit, a limit which is neither inside nor outside but, rather, the undelineated condition for all such
delineations. The limit, as the example of the contemporary university shows, is divisible and shifting; it takes
the form of questions rather than a certainty or a clear-cut line. The boundaries and the connections between
the university and the “outside world” are in a state of flux today and are liable to shift in response to a wide
range of technological, economic, and sociopolitical forces. In fact, the university is already “in the world,” just
as the “world” is already in the university—sometimes too much so for comfort. By the same token, the
question of geopolitical limits—say, of the boundaries separating the US from Latin America—are constantly
being destabilized and displaced by appearances of “latinidad” within the geopolitical borders of the United
States, which culturally, linguistically, economically and politically can no longer easily distinguish itself from
its neighbors to the south (which is not to say in facile manner that borders no longer exist). All of this is to say
that the boundary that delineates—however imprecisely and contingently—between the “outside world” and
the university (and the humanities within it) is one that we as academics must struggle to uphold and defend,
even and especially in the form of critical questioning. We must defend it not only for the obvious reason that,
in the event of its disappearance, the university and its unconditional commitment to the truth would cease to
exist. We must also uphold it because without this limit—which is the uncertain boundary between thinking
and acting, reflection and praxis, theory and politics—no event worthy of the name could ever hope to arrive.
Notes
1. For discussions of the crisis of sovereignty in the context of 9/11 see: Jacques Derrida, Rogues as well as
“Deconstructing Terrorism” and the dialogue entitled “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides” (in
Philosophy in the Time of Terror); Alberto Moreiras, Línea de sombra: El no sujeto de lo politico; and
Carlo Galli, Political Spaces and Global War. For a reflection on how the events of 9/11 could help to
reorient thinking about sovereignty in a Latin American context, see Gareth Williams, The Mexican
Exception: Sovereignty, Police and Democracy.  [#N1-ptr1]
2. In the first part of this question I am referring not to Beverley but to the recent work of Ernesto Laclau,
who has taken up a position similar to that of Beverley’s in the context of the Kirchners in Argentina. As
Laclau puts it in a recent interview in Página/12, “una democracia real en Latinoamérica se basa en la
reelección indefinida. Una vez que se construyó toda posibilidad de proceso de cambio en torno de cierto
nombre, si ese nombre desaparece, el sistema se vuelve vulnerable.” The premise of Laclau’s argument,
however, is entirely consistent with that of Latinamericanism after 9/11.  [#N2-ptr1]
3. For an illuminating discussion of the relation and the difference between deconstruction and
philosophical critique, see Jacques Derrida, “The University Without Condition”. For an extensive look at
the philosophical tradition of critique see Rodolphe Gasché, The Honor of Thinking.  [#N3-ptr1]
4. Something similar could be said about post-Kantian uses of critique. For instance, Walter Benjamin’s
“Critique of Violence” is not a condemnation of violence per se but rather, as Gasché demonstrates, an
attempt to establish a recognizable and stable boundary between “good” and “bad” forms of violence.
 [#N4-ptr1]
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